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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 9 FALL 1981 NUMBER 4
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS AND THE FLORIDA USURY
CASE
F. TOWNSEND HAWKES*
"[Two Things are to be Reconciled: The one, that the Tooth of
Usurie be grinded, that it bite not too much: The other, that
there bee left open a Meanes, to invite Moneyed Men, to lend to
the Merchants, for the Continuing and Quickning of Trade."
-Bacon, Of Usurie, in ESSAYES 171 (1896).
I. INTRODUCTION
With high interest rates besetting the financial market place,1
commercially sophisticated lenders and borrowers are forced to
seek ways to escape the limits imposed by usury laws upon their
financing activities within a given state. Incorporation of choice-of-
laws provisions into loan transactions is one method of invoking a
more permissive usury ceiling.' Along with the choice-of-laws pro-
vision, parties often attempt to structure the transaction by pur-
posely creating or manipulating as many "contacts" as possible to
ensure that the chosen jurisdiction's law will be applied by any fo-
rum in which litigation may happen to arise between the parties.'
If an interstate lender were domiciled in State A, for example, and
desired that the usury laws of that state control a multistate loan,
he would manipulate the rules on formation of contracts to ensure
* Law clerk for Chief Justice Alan C. Sundberg, Supreme Court of Florida. A.B. 1972,
magna cum laude, Harvard; M.A. 1975, Queen Mary College, University of London; J.D.
1980, Cornell.
1. When this article was written, the prime lending rate was 18% per annum. The prime
rate is that rate at which large banks lend to their most creditworthy, corporate borrowers.
2. For discussion of choice-of-laws problems in contracts, see generally R. WmraAmu,
COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 7.1-7.9 (2d ed. 1980); H. GOODRICH & E. ScoLms,
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 106-114 (4th ed. 1964); R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFICTS LAW §§ 144-56
(3d ed. 1977); Levin, Party Autonomy: Choice-of-Law Clauses in Commercial Contracts, 46
GEo. L.J. 260 (1958).
3. The ease with which certain contacts may be manipulated, however, is a factor consid-
ered by courts in giving such contacts less importance when making a choice-of-laws deter-
mination. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1978),
modified, 605 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 203, Comment c (1971).
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that the contract was negotiated and signed in State A. He would
include boilerplate provisions stipulating that the law of State A is
controlling. Funds would be disbursed from State A, and payment
would be due in that state. The success of this kind of choice-of-
laws provision and structuring efforts obviously depends upon the
recognition they will be given by a particular forum court.'
Practically every state has some form of general usury law,5 yet
conflict of laws is an important consideration due to the enormous
variation among these usury laws. Interest rates allowable under
various laws are often quite different. The penalties extracted
from a violating lender range from forfeiture of part of the excess
interest7 to forfeiture of the entire principal and interest, plus
criminal penalties.8 Some states exempt corporations from protec-
tion of the usury laws;9 others do not.'0 Such variations among
4. Compare Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 626 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1980) (ignores structuring) [Woods-Tucker], rev'd on rehearing, 642 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1981) [Woods-Tucker II] with Ferdie Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land Co., Inc. v. Diversi-
fied Mortgage Investors, 603 P.2d 270 (Nev. 1979) (upholds structuring). For a discussion of
the Woods-Tucker cases see notes 81-82 infra.
5. The few states that do not have a general usury law usually have some form of partial
usury limitations. Massachusetts has only a criminal usury law which limits interest to 20%
per annum. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 271, § 49 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1980). New Hampshire
sets interest ceilings on residential second mortgages. See N.H. PEv. STAT. ANN. § 398-A:2
(Cum. Supp. 1979). Maine, however, has no general usury limitations on commercial loans
at all. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 432 (Cum. Supp. 1980).
6. Virginia has a low interest ceiling of 8% per annum. See VA. CODE § 6.1-330.11 (1979).
Maryland has this same rate on certain loans. See MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 12-103(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1980). Rhode Island has one of the highest rates at 21% per annum, along with
Maine which has no limit on commercial loans. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-26-2 (1969). Some
interest ceilings are floating and are tied to the Federal Reserve discount. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2301 (Cum. Supp. 1980). One commentator has advocated this floating
usury ceiling for Florida. See Long, Trends in Usury Legislation-Current Interest Overdue,
34 U. MIAMI L. REv. 325 (1980). Florida's rate is currently 18% per annum on loans not
exceeding $500,000, and 25% per annum on loans greater than that amount. See FLA. STAT.
§§ 687.02, 687.071 (Supp. 1979 & Supp. 1980).
7. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 501 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-
14-117 (1979).
8. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-511 (McKinney 1978); N.Y. PENAL § 190.42 (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1980). Delaware provides for a penalty of the greater of three times the interest
or $500. DEL. CODE tit. 6, § 2304 (1974). Florida provides for a penalty of twice the interest
paid on loans not exceeding $500,000. FLA. STAT., § 687.04 (1979). For usury loans in excess
of that amount the loan is unenforceable and criminal sanctions are imposed. FLA. STAT. §
687.071 (1979).
9. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OmaG. LAW § 5-521 (McKinney 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
2306 (1974).
10. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1-37-9 (1979); FLA. STAT. § 687.01-.13 (1979
& Supp. 1980). Florida repealed the allowance of a higher interest rate to corporations in
1979 Fla. Laws ch. 79-274, § 12.
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usury laws make it apparent that a loan which conforms to the
usury laws of one state may grossly violate the usury laws of sev-
eral other states, possibly subjecting an interstate lender to serious
losses under a more restrictive usury law. As interest rates climb,
the interstate lender will find that his forum's permissible limits
violate the law of an increasing number of jurisdictions, thereby
increasing his potential for incurring usury penalties. The inter-
state lender must, therefore, first determine which jurisdictions are
connected with the transaction. He must then determine which of
these jurisdictions has the most favorable usury law. Alternatively,
he could identify the states which allow application of foreign
usury laws more favorable than his own.
This article examines express choice-of-laws provisions litigated
in Florida usury cases.11 The background of conflicts in usury is
traced briefly, and the traditional or majority approach to this
problem is discussed. The choice-of-laws approaches of both the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and the Uniform Com-
mercial Code will be examined. Florida's approach to usury in con-
flicts will be traced historically. The remainder of the Article is
devoted to the analysis of the present state of conflicts doctrine in
Florida, following the important reformulation of principles in
Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc.
1 2
II. BACKGROUND: CHOICE OF LAWS IN USURY
A. Traditional Rule
Most courts recognize that a conflicts problem in the usury case
presents a special choice-of-laws problem. Such courts follow a
special, traditional usury rule,"3 rather than relying upon standard
contracts-conflicts rules, such as place of execution or place of per-
formance. " The traditional usury rule may be stated as follows:
11. For a summary of the functioning pragmatics of Florida's usury law, see Note,
Usury: 1979 Florida Statutory Reform Partially Solves Usury Regulation Defects, 31 U.
FLA. L. Rv. 756 (1979).
12. 395 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1981).
13. See, e.g., Fahs v. Martin, 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955); Cooper v. Cherokee Village
Dev. Co., 364 S.W.2d 158 (Ark. 1963); Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 376
(lst Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Big Four Mills, Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Co., 211 S.W.2d 831
(Ky. 1948).
14. Place of execution or making (lex loci contractus) is the most commonly used stan-
dard conflicts rule for contracts problems, and is usually the place where a contract is ac-
cepted. See Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878); 2 J. BE.ALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.57
(1935). Place of performance (lex loci solutionis) follows the law of the place where the
1981]
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The general principle in relation to contracts made in one place
to be performed in another is well settled. They are to be gov-
erned by the law of the place of performance, and if the interest
allowed by the law of the place of performance is higher than that
permitted at the place of contract, the parties may stipulate for
the higher interest without incurring the penalties of usury. The
converse of this proposition is also well settled. If the rate of in-
terest be higher at the place of the contract than at the place of
performance, the parties may lawfully contract in that case also
for the higher rate.15
This articulation of the traditional rule is simply a rule of valida-
tion; if either connected jurisdiction validates the loan, then it will
be upheld under that validating law. This rule was first expressed
in Miller v. Tiffany,"' in which the forum borrower sought invali-
dation of the loan by application of New York usury law. New
York was the place of making and residence of one of the lenders.
The Supreme Court upheld the loan under the higher usury rate of
the place of performance, which was also the residence of the co-
lender.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the traditional
rule in Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co. 17 In this case, a
Pennsylvania corporate lender was allowed to charge a New York
borrower the highest rate allowed by either the place of perform-
ance, place of execution, or place with some vital and natural con-
nection. Neither Pennsylvania nor New York law would totally val-
idate the loan, but the penalty under the former state's laws was
less severe than that of New York. The Court allowed the lender
use of the limits of his home state's usury laws. The Court also
performance is carried out, and, when a loan is involved, is equated to place of payment. See
First Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 525 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1976). See gener-
ally, R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at § 7.3A; R. Lawwl, supra note 2, at § 146. Party auton-
omy, though more a rationale than a rule, simply allows parties to choose the controlling
law, but always within certain parameters. See 2 J. BEALE, supra at § 332.2 (1935).
15. Miller v. Tiffany, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 298, 310 (1863). (citations omitted).
16. Id. Three states were connected with the transaction: Indiana, residence of the bor-
rower; New York, residence of one lender; and Ohio, residence of a second lender. Only Ohio
would uphold the loan. Place of making was either New York or Indiana. Place of payment
was Ohio. Notably, the borrower did not invoke the usury protections of his home state,
Indiana.
17. 274 U.S. 403 (1927). Even though decided prior to Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938), which severely limited the scope of federal conflicts rules, Seeman has been one
of the most influential cases on later state and federal court decisions in the usury-conflicts
area.
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qualified a requirement of "good faith" as set out in Miller,18 inter-
preting it to mean only that the chosen law must have some vital
and natural connection with the transaction.19 The traditional rule
after Seeman would uphold an interstate loan contract against at-
tack based upon usury rules, so long as any vitally connected juris-
diction, would uphold the agreement.
After Seeman, the most influential case in the development of
the traditional rule was Fahs v. Martin,20 a 1955 Fifth Circuit deci-
sion which purported to determine the Florida and federal con-
flicts rules in usury actions as follows:
[W]ith respect to the question of usury, it may be stated as a
well-established rule that a provision in a contract for the pay-
ment of interest will be held valid in most states if it is permitted
by the law of the place of contracting, the place of performance,
or any other place with which the contract has any substantial
connection.2
This formulation may be seen as the final assessment of the tradi-
tional rule, a rule which by the time of Fahs v. Martin a majority
of jurisdictions, according to that case, had already adopted.22
18. In Miller, the Court had said: "These rules are subject to the qualification, that the
parties act in good faith, and that the form of the transaction is not adopted to disguise its
real character." 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 310.
19. The Supreme Court stated:
The effect of the qualification is merely to prevent the evasion or avoidance at will
of the usury law otherwise applicable, by the parties' entering into the contract or
stipulating for its performance at a place which has no normal relation to the
transaction and to whose law they would not otherwise be subject.
Seeman, 274 U.S. at 408.
20. 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955). Fahs was a complex bankruptcy case in which the court
found it necessary to determine Florida's choice of laws in usury since a New York lender
had charged interest on interest, which might have been illegal in New York, to a Florida
railroad company borrower. The agreement was upheld under the validating Florida Law.
21. Id. at 397.
22. Id. To support its position, the court in Fahs quoted from Nussbaum, Conflict Theo-
ries of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893, 912 (1942) (footnotes omit-
ted), as follows:
Now the Conflict law of usury has been developed in a peculiar way by the
American courts. While in general a contract is void if it is illegal under the lex
loci contractus, courts uphold contracts if the contractual rate of interest conforms
either with the lex loci contractus or with the lex loci solutionis or with any other
place with which the transaction has a "normal relation" [language of Stone, J., in
Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., supra] . . . , the policy being to give the
parties a certain choice among the pertinent local maximum interest rates ....
[T]he usury rule ... enjoys an undisputed existence.
Id. at 397.
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The justification usually given for the rule of validation is that it
effectuates the presumed intentions of the parties that their trans-
action, into which they have voluntarily entered, be upheld if pos-
sible under a validating law.'3 The presumed intent rationale is ob-
viously inapplicable when both connected states would invalidate
the loan, as in Seeman, since the parties could hardly have pre-
sumed either invalidating law would control.' Additionally, as one
commentator has noted,'25 the borrower under normal circum-
stances could logically be presumed to prefer subjecting his con-
tract to the more protective and invalidating usury laws. A second
rationale for the rule of validation is that trade and commerce de-
mand that contracts be uniformly enforced throughout the country
so that predictability in interstate trade is furthered.26 This second
justification has a good deal of practical appeal, but total predict-
ability could easily be achieved by absolute party autonomy in
choosing a controlling law which might easily result in abdication
by a forum court of all its state's interests in controlling usurious
loans.' 7
B. Restatement (Second) Approach
The Restatement (Second) has formulated a special usury rule
which reads:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of
usury if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a
state to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is
not greatly in excess of the rate permitted by the general usury
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law under the rule of
§ 188.28
This is essentially a rule of validation, but with some limitation
upon validation if the rates of the interested states differ too
23. See Comment, Usury in the Conflict of Laws: The Doctrine of Lex Debitoris, 55
CAL. L. REv. 123, 155-57 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Lex Debitoris]; Note, The New York
Conflicts Rule for Usury Actions: A Reappraisal, 14 COLUM. J.L. Soc. PROB. 309, 324-28
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Conflicts in Usury].
24. See notes 115-123 and accompanying text infra.
25. Conflicts in Usury, supra note 23, at 324-25.
26. See Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 157-61. See also Continental Mortgage Investors
v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So.2d at 507 (Fla. 1981).
27. See R. WEiNTRAUB, supra note 2, at 357.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 203 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
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greatly.2 9 The heart of the rule is, however, the notion of substan-
tial relationship, for this is the minimum connection necessary to
allow application of a jurisdiction's laws. "[A] state must have a
normal and natural relationship to the contract and the parties." 80
The relationship is created when one significant contact (domicile,
principal place of business or place of principal negotiations) and
one contact of lesser importance (places of execution or perform-
ance) are located in the same state.a The Restatement (Second)
expresses distrust of "contacts" based upon traditional contacts
doctrine because they are easily manipulated. It places great
weight on relations which are difficult to manipulate, such as domi-
cile and place of business, in determining the existence of a sub-
stantial relationship.82
The rationale of the Restatement (Second) is stated to be pro-
tection of the justified expectations of the parties. 8 This rationale
implies a further premise that interest rates do not vary signifi-
cantly from state to state. But rates do vary considerably, and,
more importantly, so do the penalties extracted from a violating
lender." This broad spectrum of variation indicates that some
states may have differing and stronger policies against usury than
other states. Nevertheless, the party expectation rationale is some-
29. For consideration of the effectiveness of the limitations under the rule of section 188
see notes 113-14 and accompanying text infra.
30. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF Co z LIcT OF LAWS § 203, Comment c (1971). Other rele-
vant sections of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) which emphasize party autonomy in contractual
choice-of-laws are sections 187 and 188. Section 187 provides the general rule for determin-
ing the enforcability of express choice-of-laws clauses, which will be upheld unless (1) no
substantial relation exists between the transaction and chosen jurisdiction and there is no
other reasonable basis; or (2) the chosen law, if applied, would violate a fundamental public
policy of the jurisdiction which has the most significant relationship. Section 188 defines the
place of most significant relationship which is also the law to be chosen if no effective, ex-
press choice-of-laws provision is found. Section 188 fixes the place of most significant rela-
tionship by weighing the traditional contract contacts, including place of contracting, place
of negotiation, place of performance, and parties' domiciles. The degree of party autonomy
expressed in section 187, which governs express choice-of-laws clauses, is quite broad since,
ultimately, only a reasonable relation need be found, so long as the policy of the state with
the greatest interest in the transaction is not offended. See, e.g., Duskin v. Pennsylvania-
Central Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948) (limited
party activities in chosen state sufficient to support choice). For utilization in a single case
of sections 187, 188 and 203, see O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P.2d 830
(Wash. 1978) modified, 605 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1980).
31. RESTATEMENT (SFcOn)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203, Comment c (1971).
32. Id.
33. Id., Comment b. See generally Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second,
28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROS. 679 (1963); Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 166-69; R. WmN-
TRAUB, supra note 2, at 355-68.
34. See notes 6-9 and accompanying text supra.
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what more flexible than the presumed intent rationale because it
recognizes that in most modern interstate loan contracts the intent
of the parties need no longer be presumed. It is most usually ex-
pressed through choice-of-laws clauses. The rationale of upholding
party expectations, therefore, more nearly comports with modern
commercial practices.
C. Approach of the Uniform Commercial Code
Though not directly applicable to Florida usury-conflicts cases
because usury laws are exempted from its scope, 5 the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) does provide a choice-of-laws rule
which is noteworthy since it follows a course of extreme party au-
tonomy. The conflicts rule provided in section 1-105 reads:
[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and
also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law
either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern
their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this Act applies to
transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state. 6
The Comments note that the "reasonable relation" standard is
similar to the standard provided in Seeman. They emphasize the
need to validate most contracts in order to achieve uniformity of
contract enforcement among U.C.C. jurisdictions." This party au-
tonomy approach is comparable to the general choice-of-laws rule
of the Restatement (Second) section 187, which allows party nego-
tiation to determine choice-of-laws unless there is no substantial
relationship or reasonable basis for the choice, or the choice would
violate the policy of a state with the most significant relationship
to that transaction (i.e. the state which has the greatest number of
important contacts).3 8 U.C.C. section 1-105 has no such public pol-
icy limitations; it requires only a reasonable relation to the chosen
law and an agreement by the parties to choose that law. 9
35. See FLA. STAT. § 680.104(2)(c) (1979). Arkansas has held the U.C.C. does not govern
in usury conflicts cases because of U.C.C. § 9-201, which recognizes the precedence of state
usury laws over Article 9. See Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 393 S.W.2d 867 (Ark.
1965). Cf. FLA. STAT. § 679.101 (1979) (Florida's enactment of U.C.C. § 9-201).
36. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1972 version). Florida's enactment of this section is at FLA. STAT.
§ 671.105(1) (1979).
37. U.C.C. § 1-105, Comments 1, 2 (1972 version).
38. See note 30 supra.
39. For an excellent discussion of U.C.C. § 1-105 and its implications, see Nordstrom &
Ramerman, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Choice of Law, 1969 DuKE L.J. 623.
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The "reasonable relation" test of section 1-105 is a broad stan-
dard, and the Comments indicate that only a significant portion of
either the formation or performance need be associated with a cho-
sen jurisdiction. One commentator claims that since the Code ex-
presses such a predilection for party autonomy, the reasonable re-
lation requirement will seldom interfere with party choice.41 The
second requirement of section 1-105, that the parties agree to the
chosen law, can restrict enforcement of choice-of-laws provisions if
one party had no choice but to accept the provision, as in a con-
tract of adhesion.'3 Unfortunately, this limitation has been eroded
by a few courts which will infer consent even if no express agree-
ment is provided.43
Although section 1-105 should not control usury-conflicts ques-
tions, at least two courts have so applied it. The court in Mell v.
Goodbody & Co." relied on section 1-105 when presented with a
usury-conflicts question, invoking the party autonomy principle of
the Code to uphold a contract against attack based upon a claim of
usury. The only other decision to rely directly on section 1-105 to
justify its choice-of-laws result is Woods-Tucker Leasing Corpora-
tion v. Hutcheson-Ingram Development Company (Woods-Tucker
i/),45 which utilized this provision in spite of the Code's warnings
See also Pedersen & Cox, Choice of Law and Usury Limits Under Texas Law and the
National Bank Act, 34 S.W.L.J. 755, 761 (1980).
40. U.C.C. § 1-105, Comment 1 (1972 version). When parties have not chosen a law, the
higher standard of "appropriate relation" determines the governing law. In spite of the lib-
eral indications of Comment 3, "appropriate relation" has often been accorded the restric-
tive meaning of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) with its place of the most significant relationship.
See, e.g., Simmons v American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 747 (S.D. Ala. 1976); alf'd,
560 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1977); Intraworld Indus. Inc. v. Girard Trust Bank, 336 A.2d 316
(Pa. 1975).
41. The Uniform Commercial Code and the Choice of Law, supra note 39, at 630.
42. Id. at 630-33. For discussion of contracts of adhesion, see note 151 infra.
43. See United States Manganese Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
576 F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1978) (court implies party intent to choice of validating law, relying
on U.C.C. § 1-105); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tamerius, 265 N.W.2d 847 (Neb. 1978)
(court implies party agreement to choice of law, citing U.C.C. § 1-105). Ordinarily, if no
express choice-of-laws clause is agreed upon, the court should determine which state has the
"appropriate relation" to the transaction and apply that state's law. See, e.g., Bunge Corp.
v. Biglane, 418 F. Supp. 1159 (S.D. Miss. 1976).
44. 295 N.E.2d 97 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973). Mell dealt with Illinois margin account customers
who asserted usury against their New York stock broker. The broker effectively loaned
money to its margin account customers, who only paid a certain portion of a stock's
purchase price, the broker paying the rest and charging for this service. The Illinois appel-
late court found these transactions governed by Article 8, and applied U.C.C. § 1-105 to find
a reasonable relation to New York, which allowed the interest rate charged by its brokers.
Article 8 does not, in fact, appear to cover this type of margin account.
45. 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981). For an analysis of why it is improper to use the Code
1981]
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that usury is outside the Code's scope. But the better decisions in
this area only utilize the Code's choice-of-laws provision by anal-
ogy, and do not rely on it as the controlling law, turning instead to
the body of state common law to solve the usury-conflicts
problem.46
D. Florida's Historical Approach
Florida has followed a minority of state jurisdictions which fails
to distinguish the usury-conflicts case from any other contracts-
conflicts problem. Thus in the first Florida case to deal with this
problem, Thomson v. Kyle,47 the Florida Supreme Court applied
the law of place of execution and place of payment as it would
have done in any contracts case which involved several jurisdic-
tions. The court merely referred to these mechanical choice-of-laws
principles without explication.
The next significant Florida decision was Atlas Subsidiaries,
Inc. v. 0. & 0., Inc., which involved a loan made by a Florida
corporation to a Florida borrower, who was required by the lender
to incorporate to attain a higher interest limit.49 Though the note
was executed in Florida and secured by Florida real estate, it was
payable in Pennsylvania, residence of the lender's home office. The
court refused to look to the law of the place of performance, which
it claimed, without citation to authority, would be the controlling
law. The court refused to apply foreign law because the lender was
under these conditions, see notes 82, 93 infra.
46. See Gamer v. duPont Walston, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 230 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
which confronted the same margin accounts-usury claim as in Mell. The California appel-
late court, however, recognized that the Code did not control the usury question, and found
a substantial relationship with New York, as required under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 187, 203. The court noted, however, that "substantial relationship" of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) and "reasonable relation" of U.C.C. § 1-105 were equivalent stan-
dards in this case. See also Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 393 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1965)
which found that the Code did not control usury questions in Arkansas. But see United
States Manganese Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 576 F.2d 153 (8th
Cir. 1978), which appears to undermine Lyles by relying heavily on U.C.C. § 1-105 when
Arkansas margin accounts customers sued their New York broker for usury.
47. 23 So. 12 (Fla. 1897). Thomson involved a mortgage and note, secured by Florida
property, where all of the parties were Alabama residents. Alabama law made the note usu-
rious. Since the places of execution and performance were both in Alabama, the laws of that
state governed. Even under the rule of validation, it is questionable whether the mere loca-
tion of property securing a loan is sufficient to create a normal relation with that state. See
note 102 infra.
48. 166 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
49. The forced incorporation was denounced as a sham by the district court. Id. at 461.
Florida corporations no longer can obtain a higher usury ceiling. See note 10 supra.
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essentially an in-state lender, and because the note expressly chose
Florida law. In dicta, the appellate court outlined the rule of vali-
dation; this essay marked the first appearance of the rule in a court
of this state."0
Until recently,5' the final pronouncement by a Florida court on
usury in conflicts was found in the 1974 opinion of Goodman v.
Olsen.52 A Florida borrower there asserted the defense of usury
against a New York lender. Without discussion the Florida Su-
preme Court found that New York law controlled since New York
was the "lex loci contractus," or place of execution.5" Once again
the Florida court was not impressed by the contract's implication
of usury issues, and simply viewed a contract as a contract.
Parallel to the development of choice-of-laws rules in Goodman
v. Olsen, two Florida appellate court cases introduced a good faith
factor into usury-conflicts cases. May v. United States Leasing
Corp.,54 decided in 1970 in the fourth district concerned an indi-
vidual Florida borrower who asserted the defense of usury against
a Florida corporate lender who sought payment on furniture and
office equipment. The entire transaction took place in Florida, but
the lender claimed California law governed, since the parties had
apparently stipulated to the law of that state.55 The lender had
been granted summary judgment based on this claim. The appel-
late court reversed, finding that the trial court must determine, as
a matter fact, the good faith of the parties in referring to foreign
law.56 Notably, Goodman v. Olsen ignored this good faith standard
espoused by May, possibly because the supreme court felt that
50. The court stated:
[The place of performance rule] is derived from the presumption that parties will
be presumed to have contracted with reference to the law of the place where the
transaction would be valid rather than with reference to the law of a place where
it would be illegal and usurious.
Id. at 461.
51. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1981).
52. 305 So.2d 753 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975).
53. It was unclear whether the place of execution alone controlled, or whether the place
of performance was also a factor. New York law upheld the agreement; Florida law probably
would have held it usurious.
54. 239 So.2d 73 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
55. May was apparently the first Florida case to deal with an express choice-of-laws
clause within a usury case.
56. A few cases in other states have applied the good faith standard to determine if
evasion of usury laws is taking place when foreign law is invoked. See Woods-Tucker Leas-
ing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 626 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980) [Woods-Tucker 1],
rev'd on rehearing, 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981); Dupree v. Virgil R. Cross Mcrtgage Co.,
267 S.W. 586 (Ark. 1924).
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May was limited to cases involving summary judgments. This good
faith standard, however, was followed seven years later by the
Third District Court of Appeal in Bella Isla Construction Corp. v.
Trust Mortgage Corp.,57 which also required a factual finding of
good faith, even though some contacts with the foreign jurisdiction
existed.
The federal courts in Florida have taken a position consistent
with the early case of Fahs v. Martini8 and its rule of validation.
Two district court decision have dealt with usury-conflicts cases,
and both have validated the agreement under the foreign lender's
law. In Nicholas v. Publishers Collection Service, Inc.,59 the for-
eign law of the lender was held to control over the Florida bor-
rower's law because the places of negotiation, making, and per-
formance were all located in the foreign state. The court
apparently found these contacts with the foreign jurisdiction to be
overwhelming. The same court decided the only case in Florida,
other than May and Bella Isla, to examine an express choice-of-
laws provision in a usury setting. In Your Construction Center,
Inc. v. Dominion Mortgage & Realty Trust,60 the district court
found two grounds for upholding a loan contract between a Florida
corporate borrower and a New York business trust lender, by ap-
plying the validating lender's law. 1 The court reasoned first, that
since the weight of the contacts (place of negotiation, execution,
performance, lender's domicile) were in New York, and the parties
had expressly stipulated to New York law, that law should presum-
ably govern. Second, the courts of Florida, as evidenced by Atlas,
would follow a rule of validation, upholding the contract under the
law of the connected and validating jurisdiction. While the expres-
57. 347 So.2d 649 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Bella Isla involved a Puerto Rican
lender with an office in Florida, and a Florida borrower, required to incorporate in Puerto
Rico by the lender. The loan was executed in Puerto Rico, and payment was to be made
there. The law of Puerto Rico was chosen by the agreement. The loan was to purchase land
in Florida, which secured the loan. Summary judgment was held improper under these facts,
and a determination of good faith or evasive intent of the parties was required. Bella Isla is
a broadening of the good faith requirement introduced by May since in the latter case there
were no contacts at all with the foreign jurisdiction chosen by the agreement.
58. 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955).
59. 320 F. Supp. 1200 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 446 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1971). In this case a
Florida trustee in bankruptcy charged an out-of-state lender with usury, seeking to avoid as
preferences debts of his corporate bankrupt. The lender's foreign law was applied, which did
not allow corporations to assert the defense of the usury.
60. 402 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
61. New York, the principal place of business of the lender, did not allow corporations to
assert the usury defense. The Florida borrower was a corporation.
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sion of the rule of validation in Atlas was clearly dicta, the federal
district court decision further etched the validation rule into Flor-
ida law.
Historically, Florida courts have not treated a usury-conflicts
case as anything other than an ordinary contracts-conflicts prob-
lem. The only suggestion that the rule of validation was the rule
Florida courts might follow came from the early federal case of
Fahs v. Martin, and 'from dicta in Atlas, which a federal district
court later repeated. The uncertainty of Florida's position in
usury-conflicts cases was abruptly ended in the recent case of Sail-
boat Key," a case that radically departs from Florida's prior treat-
ment of usury-conflicts cases.
III. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc.
A. Factual Summary and Lower Court Holdings
Sailboat Key concerned a $3,500,000 commercial loan, made by
a Massachusetts business trust" (Continental) to a Florida real es-
tate development corporation (Sailboat Key). The business trust
maintained its only office in Boston, the center of its multi-state
lending operation and residence of a majority of the founding
trustees. In 1969, Sailboat Key negotiated with the Florida
management firm, Mortgage Consultants, employed by Continen-
tal to originate, recommend, and service loans in Florida. Upon
recommendation of the management firm, the trust approved the
loan which was executed in Massachusetts. The laws of Massachu-
setts were chosen by the documents" and the note was made paya-
ble in that state. In 1971, Sailboat Key defaulted. As a result, a
settlement agreement was negotiated between the parties, modify-
ing the original loan." Under the terms of the settlement, Sailboat
62. At least when commercial loans are involved. For consideration of non-commercial
loans, see notes 127-55 and accompanying text infra.
63. A business trust is created by a declaration of trust which transfers property to the
trustees, who manage the property for the beneficiaries, who generally have no direct man-
agement control over the trustees. Such a trust may qualify for special federal tax treatment
as a real estate investment trust (REIT) if several qualifications are met. Because of Inter-
nal Revenue Code requirements, a REIT must hire an independent contractor to manage its
property. See I.R.C. § 856(d)3. Income derived by the REIT from usurious interest is ex-
cluded from the favorable tax treatment given REIT income generally. See I.R.C. §
856(c)(2). See generally 3 Z. CAvrrcH, BusINEss ORGANIZATION §§ 43-44 (1981); Fox, The
Maximum Scope of the Association Concept, 25 TAx L. REv. 311 (1970).
64. See MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 107, § 3 (1975), which allows any rate of interest if the
agreement is in writing.
65. 395 So. 2d at 508. The settlement resulted in the execution by Sailboat Key of addi-
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Key borrowed $6,000,000 from a second lender, who was given a
priority mortgage on the property securing Continental's loan.
Three years later, the second lender foreclosed its mortgage, nam-
ing both Continental and Sailboat Key as defendants. Continental
sought to foreclose its subordinated mortgage, and Sailboat Key
claimed against Continental for usury.6 At trial Sailboat Key was
successful, the loan being found usurious.
The Third District Court of Appeal dismissed Continental's
claim that the agreement was controlled by Massachusetts law, a
law which both parties agreed had no usury statute.67 First, the
court reasoned that if an "agreement would violate the fixed, set-
tled, or strong public policy of the state in which the action is
brought, it will not be enforced by that state."6 Finding such a
public policy in Florida, the court held that application of Massa-
chusetts law would violate Florida's public policy.69 Second, the
court looked to the good faith requirement established in May7 0 as
another reason to avoid application of foreign law. The court relied
upon the trial court's finding that Massachusetts did not have a
"real and vital connection with the transaction" and that the par-
ties' choice of foreign law was a "scheme to evade Florida's usury
law."' 71 The trial court had determined that the parties had acted
tional mortgage notes to Continental. Continental also agreed to subordinate its mortgages
to a second lender which refinanced the project. In March, 1976, Continental began bank-
ruptcy proceedings and is presently in Chapter X. Id.
66. Id. at 508. Continental as holder of a subordinated mortgage filed a cross-claim
against Sailboat Key when the second lender foreclosed on the first mortgage. Sailboat Key
answered and cross-claimed for usury. Upon motion, the cross-claims of Continental and
Sailboat Key were severed from the main action. Continental later voluntarily dismissed its
cross-claim to foreclose on its subordinated mortgage. Id.
67. Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 354 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977).
68. 354 So. 2d at 71.
69. Id. As authority for this position, the court cited the cases of Davis v. Ebsco Indus.,
Inc. 150 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1963) and Bond v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,
246 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971), on remand, 276 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1973). Davis involved enforcement of covenants not to compete. The Third District
Court of Appeal refused to enforce the covenant as being against Florida policy. In Bond,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated the broad truism that an agreement against pub-
lic policy is unenforceable by the parties. All of the cases cited by the district court in
Sailboat Key were inapposite to the issue of public policy behind usury laws. Id.
70. 354 So. 2d at 72.
71. Id. As support for this conclusion, the court cited Continental Mortgage Investors v.
Village By the Sea, Inc., 252 So. 2d 833, 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971), which dealt with
the scope of pre-trial discovery, an obvious distinction from Sailboat Key. The court in
Village By The Sea stated in dicta that the public policy of Florida might prohibit choice-
of-laws provisions which circumvented this state's usury laws.
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to evade Florida usury laws by finding there was no valid business
purpose justifying the contacts established with Massachusetts.
The appellate court thus felt constrained to affirm the trial court's
application of Florida law since the issue of good faith was a ques-
tion of fact and not reviewable on appeal.
B. On Appeal to the Florida Supreme Court
In a lengthy, analytical opinion 2 the Florida Supreme Court
unanimously rejected the district court's dual rationale for apply-
ing Florida law; instead, the court embarked upon an untraveled
course in Florida. The court first disposed of the public policy jus-
tification as an unwarranted "shibboleth," noting that a majority
of courts do not consider that conclusory slogan a sufficient ground
to justify application of their own usury laws in a choice-of-laws
situation .7  The court reasoned that the great number of excep-
tions to the usury statute and the legislature's recent raising of the
usury ceiling indicated a flexible approach. Florida's legislative
practices thus militated against the inference of a strong public
policy with regard to usury.7
The supreme court then rejected the good faith requirement75
which originally had been introduced into Florida law by May. The
court also receded from the place of execution-place of perform-
ance approach it had adopted in Goodman v. Olsen,6 stating that
these contacts were easily manipulated, and therefore suspect. In-
stead, the traditional rule of validation as expressed in Seeman7 7
and Fahs8 was adopted. The rationale underlying the newly
adopted rule was explained in terms of party expectation, as delin-
eated by the Restatement (Second). Quoting from section 203,
Comment b,7 9 the court justified upholding party expectations
72. 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981). Only six members of the court voted. Justice McDonald
did not participate in the case. Certiorari was originally denied, but since North Am. Mort-
gage Investors v. Cape San Bias Joint Venture, 357 So.2d 416 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977),
aff'd, 378 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1979), was granted certiorari, conflict was apparent because of the
double penalty allowed in Sailboat Key, and certiorari was granted on rehearing on January
25, 1978.
73. Id. at 509.
74. Id.
75. 395 So. 2d at 513.
76. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
77. See notes 17-19 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
79. Sailboat Key, 395 So. 2d at 511. The quote reads as follows:
A prime objective of both choice of law... and of contract law is to protect the
justified expectations of the parties. Subject only to rare exceptions, the parties
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through considerations of party autonomy in a commercial set-
ting.80 A second justification was found in the furtherance of com-
mercial comity and stability in interstate transactions. With par-
ticular emphasis on the federal Fifth Circuit cases, the
development of the rule of validation was traced. The court, how-
ever, specifically rejected the approach of a recent fifth circuit de-
cision, Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Devel-
opment Co. (Woods-Tucker I).81 This case refused to follow the
long line of fifth circuit decisions upholding the traditional rule,
and instead protected the forum borrower against usurious rates
charged by the out-of-state lender.
8 2
will expect on entering a contract that the provisions of the contract will be bind-
ing upon them. . . . Usury is a field where this policy of validation is particularly
apparent . . .. [Tihe courts deem it more important to sustain the validity of a
contract, and thus to protect the expectations of the parties, than to apply the
usury law of any particular state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 203, Comment b (1971).
80. See note 97 infra.
81. 626 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on rehearing, 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981).
Woods-Tucker I relied on Dugan v. Lewis, 14 S.W. 1024 (Tex. 1891), which was not actually
a usury-conflicts case since the forum law, as applied, validated the contract, and the forum
borrower was quite properly not protected by the foreign lender's law. Also relied upon was
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Griffin, 39 S.W. 656 (Tex. 1897), in which the Texas court found
the out-of-state lender had carried on ten years of extensive lending in Texas, was licensed
to do business there, and was therefore in reality a Texas lender subject to its laws. Woods-
Tucker I failed to distinguish cases such as Griffin on the basis that Griffin dealt with a
foreclosure of an individual's homestead and not with large commercial interests. See also
Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 77 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1935). Lubbock
Hotel refused to follow Griffin since the latter case assumed invocation of foreign law by the
lender was a device to evade forum law, and in Lubbock Hotel there was no evidence of the
out-of-state lender carrying on a significant in-state business.
82. On April 3, 1981, the Fifth Circuit saw the error of its way and vacated its prior
decision by rendering an entirely new opinion on rehearing more consistent with Sailboat
Key. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir.
1981) [Woods-Tucker II]. In Woods-Tucker II, the federal court unfortunately relied di-
rectly on Texas' enactment of the Uniform Commerical Code § 1-105(1) (1972 version), be-
coming one of the first courts to do so under these circumstances. See notes 35-45 and
accompanying text supra. The transaction was held to be one creating a secured interest
within the scope of Article 9, bringing into play U.C.C. § 1-105(1). The court then found a
"reasonable relation" to the state of Mississippi, home of the lender, places of execution and
payment, and the state whose law was chosen by contract and which would impose lighter
usury penalties. Even though the Mississippi lender was licensed to do business in the bor-
rower's state, Texas, and maintained four Texas offices, the lender was surprisingly accorded
foreign status, almost without question by the court. Reliance on U.C.C. § 1-105(1) is partic-
ularly unfortunate in a usury case because U.C.C. § 9-201 (1972 version) makes clear that
usury laws are "examples of applicable laws, outside this Code entirely, which might invali-
date the terms of a security agreement." U.C.C. § 9-201, Official Comment (1972 version)
(emphasis added). U.C.C. § 9-201 reads in pertinent part: "Nothing in this article validates
any charge or practice illegal under any statute or regulation thereunder governing
usury. ... ." The court in Woods-Tucker II effectively validated part of a usurious charge
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The supreme court cited two recent cases from other states
which dealt with similar situations." Both cases involved an out-
of-state lender who had engaged in substantial negotiations within
the borrower's forum state, even to the point of the lender's having
an office in the forum state. Both cases looked to the domicile of
the lender as creating a normal relationship with the foreign
lender's law, which was then applied.
Finding that Continental had an established domicile and prin-
cipal place of business in Boston, and adding that the places of
execution and payment were also in Boston, the court determined
that a "normal relation" between the loan transaction and Massa-
chusetts existed, and that the law could be stipulated by the par-
ties without consideration of the parties' good faith. Thus the
court explicitly rejected the necessity of a finding of good faith as
set out in May and Bella Isla," at least in the commercial setting
of Sailboat Key. Finally, the court noted that Massachusetts ap-
peared to have a criminal usury law, and that therefore the case
must be remanded to the trial court for a factual finding of Massa-
chusetts law.85 This development led the court to adopt in a foot-
note an extension of the rule of validation," which applies the law
of the more liberal jurisdiction in the event that both connected
states would invalidate the loan.
IV. CONFLICTS AND USURY IN FLORIDA
A. Status of Public Policy and Good Faith
Without doubt the exigencies of commercial reality provide a ba-
by utilizing the Code's choice-of-laws provision, in apparent conflict with the intentions of
U.C.C. § 9-201.
The principal Texas case relied upon by Woods-Tucker II was Walker v. Associated Fi-
nancial Services Corp., 588 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), writ ref'd n.r.e. Walker, in
turn, had relied on U.C.C. § 1-105(1) to reach the conclusion that a Texas borrower was not
protected by the Texas installment loan statute because the foreign lender's law was con-
tractually stipulated as controlling. The decision in Walker is amiss on two points. First, the
loan was evidently unsecured, and would therefore fall outside of the Code. Second, U.C.C.
§ 9-201 also excludes from the Code's coverage, at least with reference to Article 9 and
secured interests, statutes governing retail installment sales or the like. The Walker decision
is particularly egregious because the loan involved was a small ($7,500.00) mall-order loan,
and the court should have considered the increased protections required for the consumer or
non-commercial borrower. See notes 127-155 and accompanying text infra.
83. Ferdie Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 603 P.2d
270 (Nev. 1979); Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. H & B Inc., 597 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1980).
84. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text supra.
85. See MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 271, § 49 (1980).
86. Sailboat Key, 395 So.2d at 513 n.9.
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sis for adopting the rule of validation. Implicit in many decisions
in this area is the recognition that interstate commercial transac-
tions are not in fact the targets of usury protections. 7 The numer-
ous exceptions to the usury statute and its constantly changing in-
terest limit suggest that the statute does not set an absolute ban
on usurious loans. Sailboat Key recognizes that an essential ele-
ment to the just operation of a usury statute is flexibility in the
face of ever changing commercial demands. By acknowledging
through choice-of-laws principles the need for flexibility in the ap-
plication of usury laws, the court has simply kept abreast of the
more modern conflicts theory in usury cases.
Florida now follows the majority of jurisdictions in its restrictive
attitude towards the public policy behind usury laws. 88 Two for-
87. Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 135. The explanation for not protecting a consumer
under usury laws is that he theoretically voluntarily purchases the commodity, and hence
cannot be a necessitous borrower. For a criticism of the soundness of this belief, see Ben-
field, Money, Mortgages and Migraine-The Usury Headache, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. REV.
819, 846-47 (1968) [hereinafter cited as The Usury Headache].
88. The most recent Florida case in the usury-conflicts area is Morgan Walton Proper-
ties, Inc. v. International City Bank & Trust Co., No. 58,879 (Fla. Oct. 8, 1981), which was
before the court on a certified question from the federal Fifth Circuit. The question read as
follows:
Are notes executed and payable in a state other than Florida, secured by a mort-
gage on Florida real estate, providing for interest legal where made, but usurious
under Florida law, unenforceable in Florida courts due to Florida's usury statute,
public policy or otherwise, where (a) the interest charged or paid exceeds 25 per-
cent and (b) where the interest charged does not exceed 25 pertent, but exceeds
the maximum interest rate allowed by law?
International City Bank & Trust Co. v. Morgan Walton Properties, Inc., 612 F. 2d 227, 229
(5th Cir. 1980).
Walton Properties involved two cases, the first with a corporate Florida borrower and the
second with an individual Florida borrower. Louisiana, home of the lender, had no usury
limit for corporate borrowers. The lenders apparently had no contacts with Florida. In the
case of the corporate borrower, the court had no trouble in simply following Sailboat Key to
uphold the loan under validating Louisiana law, reiterating much of what had been stated in
Sailboat Key. Louisiana law was found to have a "normal and reasonable relation" to the
agreement because that state was the domicile of the lender, the parties stipulated to the
law of Louisiana, and that state was the place of making and performance. Slip op. at 6.
The second case, involving the individual borrower, presented a more interesting problem,
both because there was no choice-of-laws provision in the agreement, and the laws of both
states invalidated the agreement. Under Louisiana law, the interest alone was forfeited.
Under Florida law, depending on the amount of interest, either the interest was forfeited or
the entire loan was unenforceable. In the former case, in which both laws extracted the same
penalty, there was of course no conflict-of-laws problem, though the court seemed unaware
of this. If the entire loan, however, were unenforceable due to Florida's criminal usury provi-
sion, Fla. Stat. § 687.071 (1973), Louisiana's law would be more lenient as only interest
would be forfeited. Walton Properties again correctly followed the holding of Sailboat Key
by allowing the more favorable law to control. See Sailboat Key, 395 So. 2d at 513 n.9.
Because no interest had apparently been collected the double interest penalty did not apply.
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eign cases are representative of this position. First, Ury v. Jewelers
Acceptance Corp.89 dealt with an out-of-state New York lender
who had solicited a forum borrower in his home state, California.
The lender required the borrower to incorporate in order to avoid
New York's usury laws, which denied the usury defense to corpora-
tions. Observing that the loan was a retail commercial business
loan, the appellate court found that California had no public policy
against enforcement of this loan because of the large number of
exceptions carved from the general usury statute. 0 The California
court also considered as significant the contractual choice-of-laws
provision which stipulated New York law. Second, Big Four Mills,
Ltd. v. Commercial Credit Corp. 1 involved an out-of-state lender
who was not qualified to do business in the forum. The court de-
termined that so long as a vital element of the transaction such as
execution, performance, or party intent was connected to the for-
eign state, the enforcement of the loan according to the law of the
lender's state would not be against public policy. This position was
maintained in spite of the lender's substantial activities in the fo-
rum (lender was a subsidiary of a forum corporation.) 2 Ury and
Big Four Mills both stand for the general proposition that public
policy will seldom be invoked by the forum state to preserve its
usury laws in an interstate loan situation, provided that the deal-
ings are commercial in character and involve parties possessing the
necessary business acumen.as
The loans involved were large and evidently commercial. The first case involved over six and
one-half million dollars. Notably, the lack of an express choice-of-laws provision was not
determinative. Because the lender had no evident contacts with Florida and the loan was
commercial, the result in Walton Properties was properly and easily reached.
89. 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964). The court also found that the parties'
bargaining power was not overly disparate, the borrower being fairly sophisticated.
90. Solevo v. Aldens, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 861 (D. Conn. 1975) provided another way to
circumvent public policy. Once the court found foreign law applicable, it reasoned that fo-
rum policy could not be offended by a foreign transaction, unless the agreement were also
usurious under foreign law.
91. 211 S.W.2d 831 (Ky. 1948). Maryland, the lender's state, prohibited corporations
from asserting the usury defense. The contract also stipulated to Maryland law as the place
of execution. Because the loan agreement was between two corporations, the court, seemed
determined to uphold it.
92. There was, however, no proof that the lender was doing business in the forum state.
Id. at 835.
93. Sailboat Key did not rely on FLA. STAT. § 671.105(1) (1979) or the Uniform Commer-
cial Code which provides:
[W]hen a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another
state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such
other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement
this code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
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The adoption of the rule of validation is perhaps a recognition
that a subjective test9 4 of good faith in the choice-of-laws area is
inherently unworkable because of its lack of predictability. The
line between avoiding a forum's usury law for legitimate reasons
and circumventing the laws in bad faith was difficult if not impos-
sible to ascertain. Seeman was the first case to point out the dan-
gers of a literal good faith standard since choice-of-laws provisions
will normally be used only to "avoid" the usury laws of the fo-
rum.95 This untenable subjective standard is replaced by a more
objective standard of "normal relation," with its emphasis on the
domicile and place of business, the contacts which are the most
difficult to manipulate.
V. NEW STANDARD: NORMAL RELATION
A. Basis
Under Florida law, a critical question in determining the validity
of a multistate loan is whether there exists a "normal relation" be-
tween the loan transaction and jurisdiction whose law is purport-
edly controlling. Sailboat Key pointed to two important contacts
under this test: domicile and place of business." Because of the
difficulty that contracting parties will normally encounter in
manipulating domicile and place of business, these contacts are es-
sential in defining a "normal relation." From the emphasis placed
upon these contacts, it would appear that a "normal relation"
could not exist unless domicile and principal place of business were
both present. These critical contacts are the foundation upon
which the reasonable expectations of the parties are laid.'7
Usury laws are specifically exempted from the Commercial Code and take precedence over
any Commercial Code provisions. See FLA. STAT. §§ 680.104(2)(c), 679.201 (1979). Utiliza-
tion of the Commercial Code is also inappropriate because the loan involved in Sailboat
Key is outside of the scope of the Code. See J. WHrr & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 22-6 (2d ed. 1980). See notes 35-43 and accompanying text supra.
94. See Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of Contracts: Cases versus Restatement, 51 YALB
L.J. 893, 897-900 (1942), for development of the subjective-objective distinction in conflicts.
95. Seeman, 274 U.S. at 408.
96. "In addition to the domicile-place of business contacts, which we consider most sig-
nificant, the loan agreement was executed in Massachusetts, the loan was made payable in
that state, and the funds were originally disbursed from that state." 395 So. 2d at 513.
97. For discussion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) and its predilection for upholding party
expectation, see notes 109-14 and accompanying text infra. See also notes 28-34 and accom-
panying text supra. See generally, R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 335-380.
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B. Normal Relation in Other Courts
Having adopted the traditional rule of validation, Florida has
tapped into a wealth of foreign case law. A large body of doctrine
deals with the scope of a "normal relation" to the chosen state's
law within the rule of validation. Numerous cases find that a "nor-
mal relation" exists when the out-of-state lender is domiciled and
has its principal place of business in the foreign state." Though
these cases usually identify the lender's state as the place of per-
formance and place of execution, this is not always the case. 99
These easily manipulated contacts seldom seem to be the deciding
factor, although place of performance (payment) most often coin-
cides with the lender's state. Thus, in Fahs v. Martin00 Florida
law was applied to uphold an agreement even though its place of
execution and performance was New York because the borrower
and the mortgaged property were both in Florida, giving the vali-
dating laws of that state a substantial interest or normal relation.
The deciding factor in Fahs was therefore not the place of per-
formance or the place of execution; the critical factor was which
state with a "normal relation" to the transaction would validate
the agreement.
A few cases have held that merely being incorporated in a state
is an insufficient basis for creating a "normal relation." In United
Divers Supply Co. v. Commercial Credit Co., 101 incorporation in
98. See, e.g., Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Pa. Mortgage Trust, 599 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1979);
Consolidated Jewelers, Inc. v. Standard Financial Corp., 325 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1963); Black-
ford v. Commercial Credit Corp., 263 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 825 (1959);
Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tamerius, 265 N.W.2d 847 (Neb. 1978).
99. See Merchants' & Mfr.s' Sec. Co. v. Johnson, 69 F.2d 940 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 569 (1934); Wilkins v. M & H Financial, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 212 (E.D. Ark. 1979), affd,
621 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1980). Merchants' involved an interstate business loan contract that
was performed in both the state of the lender and that of the borrower. 69 F.2d at 943. The
case followed Seeman upholding the contract under the lender's law because his principal
place of business in the foreign state gave the lender a legitimate interest in seeking the
benefit of foreign laws. See also Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. H & B, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 303
(Tenn. 1980) (place of execution in forum state but loan upheld under foreign law since
lender had "normal relation" with foreign state).
100. 224 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1955). It is ironic to note that in spite of the heavy reliance
on Fahs by the court in Sailboat Key, Fahs was not a true usury-conflicts case because only
the law of the lender's state, New York, could have invalidated the loan. The federal court
would further the interests of neither state by using a New York law to invalidate an agree-
ment to protect a Florida borrower. For a discussion of false or avoidable conflicts see Cur-
rie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial
Function, 26 U. CH. L. REV. 9 (1958); Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 74
(1967).
101. 289 F. 316 (5th Cir. 1923). See also Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 730
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Delaware was not sufficient to create a "normal relation" with that
state. Instead, the state in which the lender's principal office was
located, which was also the place of performance and execution,
was determined to have a "normal relation." 102
The most difficult problem occurs not in defining "normal rela-
tion," but in determining the point at which a foreign lender be-
comes a domestic lender. The public interest in the regulation of
such lenders dictates that they simply will not be allowed unfet-
tered use of choice-of-laws principles.'" The court in Sailboat Key
was careful not to adopt the position enunciated in Goodwin
Brothers Leasing, Inc. v. H & B Inc.10 4 which allowed an out-of-
state lender with an in-state office to maintain its foreign posture
and thereby invoke foreign law. Although in Sailboat Key negotia-
tions were carried on in Florida, the only office of Continental and
the residence of a majority of the founding trustees were in Massa-
chusetts. 0 5 Continental's relationship with the Florida manage-
ment firm was close, but the entities were legally separate. The
supreme court's reticence in adopting the position in Goodwin
Brothers may indicate that given more in-state activity by a bor-
rower, the court would be unwilling to preserve a lender's status as
an out-of-state lender. 00 This rationale underlies such cases as
Woods-Tucker P07 and Mirgon v. Sherk, 0 8 which found that the
(3d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 897 (1931).
102. One case has extended the concept of "normal relation" to include a state where the
security for the loan is located and the borrower conducted his business, although neither
party was domiciled in that state. Armstrong v. Alliance Trust Co., 88 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.
1937). But this case is not a true conflicts case because the laws of all connected jurisdic-
tions upheld the agreement. In contrast, North Carolina has made the place of security the
exclusive, controlling factor, and will not look to foreign law even though a "normal rela-
tion" exists with the foreign state, so long as North Carolina property secures the loan.
Equilease Corp. v. Belk Hotel Corp., 256 S.E.2d 836, cert. denied, 261 S.E.2d 121 (N.C.
1979).
103. In the usury-conflicts area, courts often seem to give great weight to the lack of
forum business by an out-of-state lender, to justify invocation of foreign law. See, e.g., Whit-
man v. Green, 289 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1961); Smith v. Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 87 F.2d 839
(5th Cir. 1937).
104. 597 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1980).
105. For purposes of determining federal diversity of citizenship, a federal court will
look to the citizenship of the trustees of a business trust, and not that of the beneficiary
shareholders. Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980).
106. The Supreme Court of Idaho has held that a foreign lender who is qualified to do
business in the state may not invoke foreign law by merely making the note payable in its
foreign state since the lender is no longer foreign. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Lanzarotti, 274 P. 630 (Idaho 1929).
107. Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 626 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1980) [Woods-Tucker 1], rev'd on rehearing, 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981). In Woods-Tucker
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lender had so much in-state activity that it functioned as a domes-
tic business, subject to the forum's laws.
C. Focus of Normal Relation in Terms of Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971)
The rationale of the Restatement (Second) § 203, Comment b,109
supports adoption of the rule of validation, with its emphasis on
"normal relation." The rationale underlying section 203,110 the spe-
cial conflicts usury rule, which is based on the same premise as the
traditional usury rule, is one which points to the pragmatics of up-
holding party expectations through party autonomy since parties
ordinarily anticipate that the contracts which they have entered
will be binding."1 The Restatement (Second) requires the state
upholding the contract to have only a "substantial relationship" to
the contract. Comment c defines this as a "normal and natural re-
lationship," and discounts places of execution and performance as
being, in themselves, significant contacts due to their easy manipu-
lation. This position is echoed in Sailboat Key where the court re-
fused to follow Goodman v. Olsen because places of execution and
performance are "today of little practical value since these con-
tacts are so easily manipulated in our mobile society."" 2 Contacts
which are critical for a substantial relationship to exist are ulti-
mately the parties' domicile and principal place of business.
A second requirement of the Restatement (Second) § 203 is that
the usury rate of the state with only a "normal relation" not
greatly exceed the rate of the state with the most significant rela-
tionship, as defined by section 188.113 Of the five contacts listed as
I the foreign lender was licensed to do business and had four offices in the forum. The court
would therefore not look to the foreign law to validate the loan. See notes 81-82 supra.
108. 84 P.2d 362 (Wash. 1938). In Mirgon the foreign lender had seven branch offices in
the forum state. The court would not allow the foreign lender to invoke its state's laws since
the lender was carrying on extensive in-state business and was violating forum public policy
against usury.
109. See notes 28-34 and accompanying text supra.
110. For the text of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1971), see note
28 and accompanying text supra.
111. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 355-63.
112. Sailboat Key, 395 So. 2d at 510.
113. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) reads:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
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controlling in section 188, places of contracting, negotiation, and
performance are subject to relatively easy manipulation. The loca-
tion of the subject matter of the contract is often inscrutable in an
interstate loan agreement. The only remaining contacts-domiciles
and principal places of business of the parties-merely duplicate
the factors applied in the Restatement usury rule. Thus, this sec-
ond requirement that both interested states have similar usury
rates does not appear to add any significant limitation to the
straightforward rule validating a contract under the law of a state
with a "normal relation." It is perhaps noteworthy that Sailboat
Key chose to adopt the traditional usury rule as developed in case
law. 1 14
D. Both States Invalidate the Contract
The problem of choosing the law to apply when neither state
would entirely uphold the agreement has been addressed only pe-
ripherally in Florida. 1 5 Because the court in Sailboat Key deter-
mined that Massachusetts, the lender's state, might itself have an
applicable usury limit, it faced at least tangentially this problem of
dual invalidation. In a footnote, the court adopted an extension of
the traditional rule which applies the law of the more lenient state
if both invalidate the agreement.1 6 This is also the position taken
by the Restatement (Second) § 203, which would apply the law of
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with
respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
114. One case, however, has relied on the differences in usury rates between the state
with a substantial relationship and that with the most significant relationship (the forum) to
avoid application of the usury section of RESTATEMENT (SECOND). See O'Brien v. Shearson
Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1978), modified, 605 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1980).
115. For cases choosing the more lenient law when neither connected state would uphold
the contract, see Wiltsek v. Anglo-Am. Properties, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
Deaton v. Vise, 210 S.W.2d 665 (Tenn. 1948). Deaton did not present a true conflict since all
parties were from the forum state, although the security and payment were in a foreign
state. For discussion of false conflicts, see note 100 supra.
116. Sailboat Key, 395 So. 2d at 513 n.9.
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the state with the lightest penalty. 1 7 The second circuit, when
faced with this problem in Speare v. Consolidated Assets Corp.118 ,
observed that a rule of validation based upon the presumed intent
of the parties was untenable, since that intent must have contem-
plated application of a law invalidating the transaction.119 Seeman
itself dealt with a situation involving two jurisdictions which would
both invalidate the loan, though applying different penalties.120
The Supreme Court chose the more lenient law in Seeman.
A more justifiable rationale under these conditions is that of
party expectations. Even though a court cannot presume an inten-
tion of the parties to have an invalidating law apply, the parties
may nevertheless have expected that the law of one of the con-
nected jurisdictions govern the transaction. More realistically,
there is a tendency by the courts to apply the more lenient law
since the courts are reticent to extract too great a penalty from a
violating lender for fear of providing the borrower with a wind-
fall.12' The cases are divided,1 22 however, and the "more lenient"
rule does not appear to have as widespread acceptance as the
traditional rule of validation under which one state upholds the
transaction. 23
VI. UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN FLORIDA'S USURY LAWS
A. Degree of Certainty of Normal Relation
Although the adoption of the rule of validation and its linchpin
of "normal relation" may be seen as an effort by the supreme court
at removing some of the subjectivity inherent in previous Florida
usury-conflicts decisions predicated on the standard of good faith,
the boundaries of the "normal relation" standard remain unknown.
A question still remains whether domicile and principal place of
business are alone sufficient to create a "normal relation." The fac-
tors of place of execution, performance, and disbursement continue
to be ones that will be considered by courts in Florida. Just what
weight these factors will be given is difficult to ascertain, though
they apparently are of less significance than the domicile-principal
117. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203, Comment d (1971).
118. 367 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1966).
119. Id. at 211.
120. Seeman, 274 U.S. at 405-06.
121. Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 195-97, 242.
122. Id. at 199-200.
123. See H. GOODRICH, supra note 2, at 217.
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place of business contacts.
Also uncertain is the test which determines when an out-of-state
lender will be characterized as an in-state lender, losing any advan-
tage of a more liberal foreign law. In Sailboat Key, Continental
had been established in Massachusetts for nine years for the legiti-
mate business reason of utilizing that state's developed law for
business trusts."2' Continental's center of business activities as a
lender was also located in Massachusetts where it maintained its
only office and carried out significant lending activities. The court
apparently considered the quality of the domicile-principal place
of business contacts, giving weight to the substance of these con-
tacts, as well as to the fact of their existence. 1 5 Ultimately, some
element of subjectivity must color any court's assessment of these
essential contacts. The point at which the domicile contacts will be
ignored due to lack of substance and a corresponding abundance of
pure formality is unpredictable. "
B. Commercial v. Consumer: Characterization Problem
By its terms, Sailboat Key is limited to commercial loans, imply-
ing that there is a class of individual, consumer loans which is not
within the scope of the opinion and which may be treated differ-
ently. 127 An examination of usury cases involving small or con-
sumer loans is therefore warranted. 12
124. Sailboat Key, 395 So. 2d at 513.
125. Id. The court noted the extensive activities of Continental in Massachusetts.
126. Compare Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 626 F.2d 401
(5th Cir. 1980) [Woods-Tucker I], rev'd on rehearing, 642 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1981) (in-state
offices overcame form that lender is out-of-state) with Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v H & B
Inc., 597 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1980) (in-state office does not affect out-of-state lender's foreign
status).
127. Although Sailboat Key did not rely on a commercial-consumer distinction, perhaps
because of the difficulty inherent in such a characterization, other courts have looked to the
relative sophistication of the parties in a large commercial loan as a reason for holding the
parties ,to the contract. See, e.g., Sarlot-Kantarjian v. First Pa. Mortgage Trust, 599 F.2d
915 (9th Cir. 1979) (borrower knowledgeable and experienced in real estate ventures); Ferdie
Sievers & Lake Tahoe Land Co. v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 603 P.2d 270 (Nev. 1979)
(borrower experienced in such business transactions); Goodwin Bros, Leasing, Inc. v. H & B
Inc., 597 S.W.2d 303 (Tenn. 1980) (borrower sophisticated, knowledgeable, businessmen).
The Florida Legislature has tacitly recognized this distinction by allowing a higher usury
ceiling (25% per annum) on loans exceeding $500,000. See FLA. STAT. §§ 687.02, 687.071
(1979 & Supp. 1980).
128. UNWORM CONSUMRs CREDIT CODE § 1.301(15)(a) (1974 Act) defines a consumer loan
as follows:
Except as provided in paragraph (b), "consumer loan" means a loan made by a
creditor regularly engaged in the business of making loans in which:
(i) the debtor is a person other than an organization;
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When the loan involves a consumer or individual, courts have
evinced strong protectionist attitudes, and have effectively adopted
a rule of lex debitoris,'2 9 which applies the law of the borrower's
domicile under most conditions.180 Lex debitoris is based on the
presumption that the law of the debtor-borrower's state must con-
trol an interstate loan contract. The lender's law will be applied
only as an exception to this premise under the following circum-
stances: the borrower is sophisticated and has sufficient bargaining
power so as not to require protection; the borrower's law provides
unduly harsh penalties; or the lender would be unfairly surprised
by application of the borrower's law.181 The first exception in effect
recognizes a "commercial" exception to the doctrine of lex
debitoris, since it allows the lender's law to apply if the parties
involved are sophisticated, as is typical in a large, commercial loan
setting. This rule has the advantage of furthering legislative aims
in passing usury laws," 2 which include the protection of a forum
borrower both from his own inexperience in the lending market
place and the rapacity of the lender, aided by the lender's superior
legal and economic expertise. 83 For this reason, lex debitoris is the
perferable rule when the consumer borrower is involved.1 "
Cases which seek to protect the small borrower often are
couched in terms of public policy, rather than consumer protection
(ii) the debt is incurred primarily for a personal, family, household, or
agricultural purpose;
(iii) the debt is payable in installments or a finance charge is made; and
(iv) the amount financed does not exceed $25,000 or the debt, other than
one incurred primarily for an agricultural purpose, is secured by an interest
in land.
Loans secured by real estate are outside this definition if the finance charge does not exceed
12% per annum.
129. See generally Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 181-88.
130. See, e.g., In re Wakefield, 460 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D. Ark. 1978); Lyles v. Union
Planters Nat'l Bank, 393 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1965). See also Note, Incorporation to Avoid the
Usury Laws, 68 COLUM. L. R.v. 1390, 1397 (1968), which takes the position that lex
debitoris is the better rule in cases of individual borrowers, but the traditional rule of vali-
dation is the preferred rule in a commercial situation.
131. Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 182-83.
132. See H. GOODRICH, supra note 2, at 217.
133. One difference between general commercial loans and small loans is that the
former may, or may not, be contracts of adhesion, depending on the circumstances
of the parties, but the latter, the small loan to the necessitous consumer-borrower,
is almost surely one whose terms are dictated by the lender to one who has not the
social or economic power to demur.
R. WINTRAUB, supra note 2, at 376.
134. See generally Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 200-24; The Usury Headache, supra
note 87, at 838-40, 881; Conflicts in Usury, supra note 23, at 338-342.
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or disparate bargaining power. The Supreme Court of Washington
in Mirgon v. Sherk"85 invoked public policy to shield a forum bor-
rower, owing $280 secured by a chattel mortgage, from an out-of-
state lender who carried on significant forum business. " ' Other
cases have invoked the same protectionist stance to prevent the
collection of 26% interest on a $650 loan to a boilermaker " 7 or
42% interest on $300 owed by a school teacher,138 thereby depriv-
ing an out-of-state lender of the liberal laws of his own state.13 9
This attitude has become prevalent in decisions from Arkansas. At
one time Arkansas adopted a liberal rule of validation in a com-
mercial case, "1 0 only to shift to choice of forum law when dealing
with a consumer transaction. This distinction, though, was never
articulated in terms other than public policy. 4 1 Courts which do
invoke public policy in the consumer borrower area are undoubt-
edly aware that the application of forum usury law will only work a
small forfeiture on the lender since consumer loans are usually for
small amounts. 42 This awareness makes borrower protection easier
to attain since the consequences of enforcing forum usury laws or-
dinarily will not be devastating to violating lenders.
The boundary implied by the distinction between commercial
and consumer loans is not always apparent. 4 3 The Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code has defined a consumer loan as one made by a
professional lender to an individual for personal, family, household
or agricultural purposes."4 The loan must be less than $25,000 or
be secured by real estate and the interest must exceed 12 percent
135. 84 P.2d 362 (Wash. 1938).
136. See also O'Brien v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 586 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1978), modi-
fied, 605 P.2d 779 (Wash. 1980). In that case, the court sought to protect the individual
investor-borrower who bought stocks in New York on margin accounts, invoking public pol-
icy to protect forum borrowers.
137. Fidelity Say. Ass'n v. Shea, 55 P. 1022 (Idaho 1899).
138. Continental Adjustment Corp. v. Klause, 174 A. 246 (Dist. Ct. N.J. 1934).
139. - Another court has protected an individual borrower on mortgaged land by holding a
50% per annum rate so shocking that choice of laws was not even a consideration. Trinidad
Indus. Bank v. Romero, 466 P.2d 568 (N.M. 1970).
140. Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., 364 S.W.2d 158 (Ark. 1963).
141. In re Wakefield, 460 F. Supp. 1224 (E.D. Ark. 1978); Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l
Bank, 393 S.W.2d 867 (Ark. 1965); Huchingson v. Republic Fin. Co., 370 S.W.2d 185 (Ark.
1963). But see Bridgeman v. Gateway Ford Truck Sales, 296 F. Supp. 233 (E.D. Ark. 1969),
modified, 311 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (individual borrower, but for business purposes;
follow lender's law as more lenient and on modification to uphold based on time-price
doctrine).
142. Lex Debitoris, supra note 23, at 171, 232-43.
143. See R. WmzNTRAu, supra note 2, at 378.
144. See note 127 supra.
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per annum. The Consumer Code is an effort at consolidating and
simplifying regulation of consumer and business loans of less than
$25,000, setting out disclosure and interest requirements under one
comprehensive law. The Consumer Code focuses its definition of
consumer, therefore, on the amount and purpose of the loan.
For usury-conflict of laws purposes, a precise definition of com-
mercial and consumer loan becomes less important where only gen-
eral usury laws are concerned because usury laws have little appli-
cation in the consumer area due to the time-price doctrine. 145 The
time-price doctrine exempts most consumer sales from usury laws
by allowing the seller to fix one price for cash and another for
credit, and by not considering this difference as interest. The mas-
sive consumer financing protections in Florida law demonstrate
that the time-price doctrine had left consumers largely unpro-
tected, and exemplify both the legislature's desire to protect con-
sumer borrowers and the awareness that the interest ceilings on
various consumer loan areas must be higher than the general usury
level. 146 However, choice-of-laws problems under the consumer
protection statutes are less often encountered since most consumer
lenders are presumably located in-state, near the resident bor-
rower.147 Also, the finance charge structure for consumer loans is
145. See generally, The Usury Headache, supra note 87, at 843-47. Florida has long
recognized this doctrine. See Davidson v. Davis, 52 So. 139 (Fla. 1910).
146. See, e.g., Florida Consumer Finance Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 516.001 et seq. (1979 &
Supp. 1980); Retail Installment Sales Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 520.30-.42 (1979 & Supp. 1980);
Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 520.01-.13 (1979 & Supp. 1980). These vari-
ous consumer protection statutes set interest rates and disclosure requirements on transac-
tions which are outside of the usury laws because of the time-price doctrine. These statutes
are therefore equivalent to affirmative usury laws for the consumer.
147. The issue as to whether a state may constitutionally apply its consumer protection
statutes to an out-of-state lender who has only minimal advertising and mail order contacts
with the consumer's state has been decided. Four federal circuits have decided that there
are neither due process nor commerce clause problems when a state chooses to protect its
consumers from the higher interest charged by an Illinois mall order house in its credit
agreements. See Aldens, Inc. v. Miller, 610 F.2d 538 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
919 (1980); Aldens, Inc. v. Ryan, 571 F.2d 1159 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 860 (1978);
Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977); Aldens,
Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976). A state court
has also reached the same conclusion. Meirhenry v. Spiegel, Inc., 277 N.W.2d 298 (S.D.),
appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 804 (1979). One would think that Aldens, Inc. would begin to see
the handwriting on the wall.
Although Florida's consumer protection statutes do not specifically apply to out-of-state
transactions, even traditional choice-of-laws rules should allow a state to pursue such a
strong policy interest as protection of its consumers. At least one statute, however, would
apparently apply its protections to mall order transactions, reaching out-of-state businesses
such as Aldens, Inc. See FLA. STAT. § 520.36 (1979).
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relatively liberal.148
An example of a loan which may pose problems of characteriza-
tion is the small business loan, which prior to 1980 escaped regula-
tion under the Florida Consumer Finance Act if it exceeded
$2,500.149 In 1980 the legislature raised the amount which a licen-
see under the act could lend to $25,000, enlarging the scope of cer-
tain consumer borrower protections previously afforded only to
borrowers of less than $2,500.150 This action would indicate that
the legislature, as suggested in the Consumer Code, considers the
small business borrower of $25,000 or less in need of consumer-
oriented protections. Assuming Florida chooses to follow those
states which apply their own law in a consumer case, this would
militate' against a rule of validation should a choice-of-laws prob-
lem arise. The problem of characterization remains unclear for
small business loans over $25,000.
The commercial-consumer distinction becomes critical, however,
when one realizes that the focus of Sailboat Key was on commer-
cial loans. Notably, the good faith requirements espoused in May
and Bella Isla still exist in Florida law, although inapplicable in
commercial cases. The implication remains that a different stan-
dard than normal relation may be required in a case characterized
as consumer, and that for these cases a good faith requirement
may survive.
A second and more viable manner of approaching the commer-
cial-consumer distinction is to give the greater protection of forum
usury and consumer finance laws to those borrowers who are vic-
tims of unequal borrowing power, adhesion contracts151 and their
own lack of expertise.152 This borrower will often be the consumer
148. Under FLA. STAT. § 516.031 (Supp. 1980), dealing with consumer finance, the inter-
est rate is 30% per annum on the first $500, 24% per annum on the next $500, and 18% per
annum on anything above $1,000. Under FLA. STAT. § 520.34(5)(a) (Supp. 1980), dealing
with retail installment sales, the interest allowed is $12 per $100 per year, or about 21.6%
per annum.
149. See FLA. STAT. §§ 516.02, 516.031 (1979).
150. See Florida Consumer Finance Act, ch. 80-412, § 1, 1980 Fla. Laws 1733 (codified as
FLA. STAT. 516.031 (1980 Supp.)).
151. Contracts of adhesion are those drafted by one party, usually a corporation with
expert legal advice, and are carefully formulated to resolve as many legal issues as possible
in favor of the dominant drafting party. The disparity of bargaining power between the
drafting party and the acquiescing party results in the second party submitting to, rather
than bargaining for, the contract terms. See generally, Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. Rxv. 629 (1943). For a
discussion of adhesion contracts in a usury-conflicts case, see Ury v. Jewelers Acceptance
Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
152. A worthwhile comparison can be made between the sophistication required of the
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borrower, but rather than focusing on the amount of a transaction
and the use to which the borrowed funds are applied by defining a
consumer loan, this approach emphasizes the actual disparity be-
tween bargaining parties and the resulting one-sided agreement.18
Outlining the "unconscionability" approach, a federal district
court has suggested the factors to be considered in determining
whether a borrower warrants protection by the court. These factors
include (1) the bargaining position of the parties; (2) the degree of
custom reflected in the agreement; (3) the degree of risk reflected
in higher rates; (4) the availability of other funds to the borrower;
(5) the benefit to commerce by increasing access to funds; and (6)
the impact of invalidation on the financing community.'" This
manner of determining which borrowers will receive increased fo-
rum usury protection is inherently subjective. But such flexibility
in the law is necessary for a court to shape its relief to assist those
individual and non-commercial borrowers who are truly at the
mercy of the overreaching lender who seeks the protection of his
higher foreign usury limitations.8 5
parties for fair contractual bargaining and the sophistication and ability to absorb loss re-
quired by Rule 146 of the Regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 17
C.F.R. § 230.146 (1981). Rule 146 outlines conditions for private offerings in which the
S.E.C. feels certain investors do not need disclosure protections provided under the Securi-
ties Act of 1933. Offerees who are either sophisticated in business matters or are able to bear
the economic risk of the investment are considered outside the disclosure requirements of
the S.E.C. if certain other conditions of Rule 146 are also met. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d)(1)
(1981). Both usury laws and securities regulations seek to protect the unwary from the over-
reaching lender or issuer, and an exception from these protections is reasonable if the bor-
rower or offeree-purchaser is capable of dealing with his nemesis on an equal footing.
153. One commentator has claimed that the rule of validation is not the appropriate
choice-of-laws rule in a usury case, and then cites examples of overreaching in consumer
loans. A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICr OF LAWS, 483, 484 & n.10 (1962). Three of the four cases
Ehrenzweig cites for the nonapplication of the rule of validation are clearly consumer cases.
Fidelity Say. Ass'n v. Shea, 55 P. 1022 (Idaho 1899) (boilermaker borrowed $650); Personal
Fin. Co. v. Gilinsky Fruit Co., 255 N.W. 558 (Neb. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 627 (1935)
(assignment of employee's wages to secure small loan); Continental Adjustment Corp. v.
Klause, 174 A. 246 (Dist. Ct. N.J. 1934) (school teacher borrowed $300). The fourth case,
Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 157 S.E. 860 (N.C. 1931), did not decide the issue of
whether the rule of validation applied, but sent the case back to the trial level for a factual
finding on good faith.
Ehrenzweig fails to recognize that courts effectively create an exception to the rule of
validation when they encounter the consumer borrower who has been exploited by a sophis-
ticated lender.
154. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 874 (E.D. Pa. 1966). See generally
The Usury Headache, supra note 87, at 883-84.
155. Another unsettled issue in Florida usury law is the degree of federal preemption
wrought by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221 § 501, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws (94 Stat.) 161 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1735f-7 note (1980)) as amended by Act of Oct. 8, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-399 §§
1981]
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VII. CONCLUSION
Historically, Florida has followed a minority of jurisdictions
which utilize ordinary choice-of-laws principles even when dealing
with an interstate loan contract involving usury. The classical
choice-of-laws rules look to place of execution and performance to
determine which law should be applied to a multistate loan con-
tract. Florida courts have also examined the subjective factor of
good faith of the parties in seeking to invoke the law of a foreign
jurisdiction.
Choice of laws in a usury setting, therefore, has been a confused
area in Florida, with decisions ignoring the rule of validation, a
special choice-of-laws rule followed by a majority of courts in usury
cases. This rule would choose the law of a state with a "normal
relation" to an interstate loan agreement which upholds the con-
tract. Sailboat Key adopted the rule of validation for Florida, at
least for commercial contracts. Under the rule of validation a "nor-
mal relation" will usually depend on the domicile and principal
place of business of the parties, thus adding a degree of predict-
ability to conflict problems in interstate loan contracts implicating
usury.
Choice of laws when individual, consumer loans are involved re-
mains an open question. The courts in this state may follow other
jurisdictions in adopting a more protectionist attitude towards con-
sumer borrowers, and apply Florida laws even if a "normal rela-
tion" exists with the state of the foreign lender. This could be done
either by defining consumer loans as exempted from the rule of
validation, or developing unconscionability standards to protect a
vulnerable borrower.
308(c)(6), 324(a), (e), 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (94 Stat.) 1641, 1647, 1648; Act of
Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35 § 384, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws (95 Stat.) 432.
Another part of the Act (§ 511) is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 86(a)(Supp. 1981). The Act
preempts state usury law for certain federally related residential loans and business or agri-
cultural loans of $1,000 or more.
